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THE CRIPPLING COSTS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM: A LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENT FOR
ELIMINATING FINES AND FEES FOR YOUTH OFFENDERS
ABSTRACT
Across the United States, approximately one million youth appear in juvenile
court each year. In almost every state, youth and their families face monetary
charges for a young person’s involvement in the juvenile justice system. Too
often the inability to pay subjects juveniles and their families to incarceration,
suspension of driver’s licenses, an inability to expunge records, and economic
and social stress, and pushes the youth offender deeper into the juvenile justice
system.
Over one hundred years ago, the Illinois legislature established the first
separate juvenile court system. That system was designed to recognize that youth
are different from adults and to respond with a focus on rehabilitation. Over the
course of the century, while state juvenile justice systems have changed, the idea
of a separate system has become firmly entrenched nationally and the core goals
of supporting youth, assisting rehabilitation, and improving outcomes have
remained the same. Fines and fees for youth offenders undermine these core
values.
This Comment argues that fines and fees imposed on youth offenders should
be eliminated nationwide because they ignore the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding
in Bearden v. Georgia, they would be categorically banned under a correct
interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause, they are applied unlawfully under
state statutes, they exacerbate economic and racial disparities, they increase
recidivism rates for juveniles, and they create hardship for families, pushing
responsibility onto sometimes uninvolved parents. Congress must safeguard the
due process rights of youth and families and ensure the juvenile justice system,
designed to support and rehabilitate, does not instead impose undue harm on
juveniles and their families.
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INTRODUCTION
Amir Whitaker had a very unstable upbringing.1 His father was in and out of
jail, many of his relatives, including his mother, were addicted to drugs, and he
lived off of his grandparents’ Social Security checks.2 Due to his family’s lack
of income, at age fifteen, crack cocaine addicts became Amir’s clients.3 To him,
this job was a crime of poverty.4 Amir explained: “When you’re in high school
and you’re having to provide breakfast for yourself, I had no other
opportunities.”5 In 2000, the police raided the house in which Amir lived.6 Amir,
still a juvenile, and his mother were arrested.7 Amir was charged and spent two
days in a juvenile detention facility, after which he was released into his aunt’s
custody.8 At Amir’s sentencing hearing, he avoided further jail time, but the
judge ordered probation, revoked his driver’s license, and imposed a fine of
roughly two thousand dollars.9 Amir said that he “had never had that amount of
money, even when selling drugs.”10 Amir managed to obtain a job at Burger
King making $5.15 an hour; however, every time he saw his probation officer,
he was required to pay a certain amount so he did not violate probation.11 “As
the fines loomed,” Amir felt he had no choice but to start selling drugs again.12
Not only do fines and fees negatively affect the individual juvenile charged,
but they also affect their families. Michael Rizo was introduced to the criminal
justice system at the early age of three when his mother was incarcerated.13
Throughout his childhood, Michael cycled in and out of foster care, and when
he was eleven, he was arrested for the first time.14 Following his first arrest,
Michael was repeatedly arrested and detained.15 As Michael’s arrests piled up,
so too did his fees for court-ordered ankle monitoring bracelets and drug tests,
1
See Eric Markowitz, The Long-Term Costs of Fining Juvenile Offenders, NEW YORKER (Dec. 24,
2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-long-term-costs-of-fining-juvenile-offenders.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Brooke Pinnix, Report: Juvenile Administrative Fees Burden Families Across California, CHRON. SOC.
CHANGE (May 4, 2017), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/news-2/juvenile-administrative-fees-burdenfamilies-california.
14
Id.
15
Id.
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and his lodging and food while incarcerated.16 The county charged Michael’s
mother forty dollars every day Michael was incarcerated.17 By the time Michael
was eighteen, his mother owed the county over $25,000.18 Michael felt so guilty
for “taking food away from his family’s table,” that at one point, he ran away
from home.19
Additional examples of these fines and fees affecting juveniles’ families
occurred in Orange County, Contra Costa County, and Los Angeles County, all
in California. In Orange County, Maria Rivera was charged more than $16,000
for her son’s detention.20 Maria sold her house to pay the county more than
$9,500; however, when the county pursued the rest of the debt, Maria was forced
to file bankruptcy.21 It was not until a federal court ordered Orange County to
stop pursuing the debt that the county ceased.22 In Contra Costa County, Mariana
Cuevas was charged roughly $10,000 for her son’s detention, even after all
charges were dropped against him.23 As a housecleaner, Mariana was already
struggling to make ends meet.24 In Los Angeles County, Sally Stokes was
charged over $1,000 for her granddaughter’s detention.25 Sally was living on
Social Security benefits and could not afford to make payments.26 Rather than
discharge the debt, the county spent nearly $13,000, more than ten times the fine,
to pursue Sally’s debt.27
In 1899, the Illinois legislature passed the Juvenile Court Act, establishing
the nation’s first juvenile court.28 The separate juvenile system was “designed to
[appreciate] that youth are different from adults,” and to respond to these
16
Teresa Wiltz, Movement Against Juvenile Court Fees Runs into Resistance, HUFFPOST (Jan. 17, 2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/movement-against-juvenile-court-fees-runs-into-resistance_us_5a5f6c2
fe4b0c40b3e5975fd.
17
Pinnix, supra note 13.
18
Stephanie Campos-Bui, Debt-Free Justice: A Bottom-Up Approach to Ending Juvenile Fees in
California, CLEARINGHOUSE COMMUNITY (Apr. 2018), [https://perma.cc/KL46-MJZH].
19
Pinnix, supra note 13.
20
Jeffrey Selbin & Abbye Atkinson, Time to End Injustice in Juvenile Justice System, ORANGE COUNTY
REG. (Aug. 18, 2017, 9:01 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/08/18/time-to-end-injustice-in-juvenile-justicesystem/.
21
Id.
22
Rivera v. Orange Cty. Prob. Dep’t, 832 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2016).
23
Eli Hager, Your Child’s Been Sent to Jail. And Then Comes the Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2017),
http://wapo.st/2lzpbZ5.
24
Id.
25
Molly Hennessy-Fiske, County Spent $13,000 to Chase $1,004, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2009), http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/04/local/me-probation-fees4.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Solomon J. Greene, Note, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of the Industrial City and the Invention of
Juvenile Justice, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 137 (2003).
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differences with a “focus on rehabilitation and child development.”29 Although
“state juvenile justice systems have changed over time,” they have always
maintained the core values of “supporting youth, assisting rehabilitation,
developing youth competency, and improving outcomes.”30 However, court
fines and fees risk undermining these core values.31 In Amir’s case, rather than
assisting in his rehabilitation, his fines led to him selling drugs again.32 In
Michael’s case, rather than improving outcomes, he felt so guilty about his fines
that he ran away from home.33 In the other cases noted above, juveniles’ families
were paying the fines and fees,34 which ignored the notion that the juvenile
system is supposed to focus on the youth offender.
This Comment argues that fines and fees for youth offenders should be
eliminated nationwide for several reasons: they ignore the U.S. Supreme Court’s
holding in Bearden v. Georgia;35 they would be categorically banned under a
correct interpretation of the Excessive Fines Clause; and they are applied
improperly under state statutes. Additionally, these financial burdens exacerbate
economic and racial disparities, increase recidivism rates for juveniles, and push
responsibility onto sometimes uninvolved parents. Part I provides a brief
overview of the different fines and fees that can be imposed on youth offenders.
Part II addresses the recent legislation in California that eliminated fines and
fees for youth offenders and several other jurisdictions that have scaled back
juvenile fines and fees in the past few years. Part III discusses the legal reasons
why Congress should ban fines and fees for youth offenders, including the ban
of debtors’ prison, the argument that these financial burdens constitute excessive
fines as defined in the U.S. Constitution, and the unlawful application of state
statutes. Part IV examines the policy reasons why Congress should ban fines and
fees for youth offenders, such as the exacerbation of disparities, the increase in
recidivism, and the hardship on families.

29

JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUVENILE LAW CTR., DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS? THE HIGH COST OF FINES
(2016).
30
Id.
31
In a recent report on juvenile fees in Alameda County, the authors quote probation officers in multiple
counties recognizing that the stress of fees may hamper efforts to support positive outcomes in the juvenile
justice system. JEFFREY SELBIN, U.C. BERKELEY POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, HIGH PAIN, NO GAIN: HOW
JUVENILE ADMINISTRATIVE FEES HARM LOW-INCOME FAMILIES IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 15–17
(2016).
32
See Markowitz, supra note 1.
33
See Pinnix, supra note 13.
34
See Hager, supra note 23; Hennessy-Fiske, supra note 25; Selbin & Atkinson, supra note 20.
35
461 U.S. 660 (1983).
AND FEES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4
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FINES AND FEES FOR YOUTH OFFENDERS

This Part provides a brief overview of some of the Legal Financial
Obligations (LFOs) that are imposed on youth offenders and their parents when
a juvenile becomes entangled with the criminal justice system.36 LFOs are fines,
fees, costs, and restitution imposed by a court over and above a criminal
sentence.37 These financial obligations are authorized or required in every state,
except for California, and are imposed on youth offenders and their parents in
forty-one states.38 LFOs include, among other things, fees for DNA samples,
electronic monitoring bracelets, jury fees, public defenders, room and board, and
drug testing.39
Some may ask, “How did we get here?” The answer is an increase in the
correctional population. Between 1980 and 2016, the total adult correctional
population rose from approximately 1,842,000 to roughly 6,613,000.40 As a
result of this increase, the cost of running prisons, jails, probation, parole, and
courts increased.41 Due to the increase in these costs, states were faced with
budget deficits.42 To offset these costs, courts started charging criminal
defendants, including juveniles, for associated expenses.43 However, because
many offenders assigned monetary penalties are unable to pay, this practice has
been ineffective in raising revenues and has placed many poor offenders,
including juveniles, in an inescapable cycle of debt.44 Additionally, “significant
research establishes that court costs, fees, and fines exacerbate poverty for
individuals in the adult criminal justice system and their families.45 The U.S.
Department of Justice has even found that the harm caused by imposing costs

36
See The Fees that Keep Juvenile Offenders in Financial Chains, SHARED JUST. (Nov. 22, 2016),
http://www.sharedjustice.org/most-recent/2016/11/21/the-fees-that-keep-juvenile-offenders-in-financialchains.
37
Questions and Answers About Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs), ACLU WASH., https://www.acluwa.org/questions-and-answers-about-legal-financial-obligations-lfos (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
38
See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at Executive Summary 1; see also Eli Hager, California Ends
Practice of Billing Parents for Kids in Detention, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 11, 2017, 9:28 PM), https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2017/10/11/california-ends-practice-of-billing-parents-for-kids-in-detention (discussing
California’s ban on assessing certain fees against parents of juvenile offenders).
39
The Fees that Keep Juvenile Offenders in Financial Chains, supra note 36.
40
Key Statistic: Total Correctional Population, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty
=kfdetail&iid=487 (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
41
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 1–2 (2015).
42
The Fees that Keep Juvenile Offenders in Financial Chains, supra note 36.
43
Id.
44
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 41, at 4–5.
45
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.

SHAPIRO_8.21.20

2020]

8/24/2020 2:29 PM

CRIPPLING COSTS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

1311

without adequate due process can be profound.46 Individuals may confront
increasing debt, face repeated incarceration for nonpayment, lose their jobs, and
become trapped in cycles of poverty.47
While most previous research has focused on the effects of fines and fees on
adults, this Comment will focus on the effects of these fines and fees on youth
offenders and their families, arguing for the elimination of all fines and fees for
juvenile offenders. A 2016 Juvenile Law Center (JLC) report found that in
almost every state and the District of Columbia, juvenile offenders who appear
in juvenile court may be charged for multiple court-related costs, fines, and
fees.48 Although the imposition of many of these fines and fees is up to the
judge’s discretion, in practice, they are often imposed.49 According to the JLC
report, under state statutes, courts may require juveniles, parents, or both to pay
court expenses,50 fees for a public defender,51 costs for evaluations and testing,
probation supervision fees and costs, fees and costs for participation in diversion
programs, child support, treatment costs, health care costs, the cost of GPS
monitoring, cost of care generally, and fines.52 Seven of these categories of fees
and the related state statutes are discussed below, emphasizing the extent of the
issue of imposing fines and fees on youth offenders.
The first type of fee is court expenses which range from a designated amount
to “an obligation to cover a broad array of costs for service, notice, deposition,
travel expenses, prosecution costs, and other legal expenses.”53 Although only
twenty-five states have statutes related to court expenses for juveniles, the JLC
survey revealed that respondents from twenty-eight states were charged such

46
Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Division, & Lisa Foster,
Dir., Office for Access to Justice 3 (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.tmcec.com/files/7614/8517/9751/00_-_Regan
__Robby_BINER_Special_Session.pdf.
47
Id. at 2; see also LISA FOSTER & KAROL V. MASON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ADVISORY FOR RECIPIENTS
OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON JUVENILES
1, 10 (2017) (issuing an advisory warning against imposing excessive fees and fines on juveniles and
emphasizing the inability of youth to pay these expenses themselves, the financial burden on their families, and
the consequences that impede rehabilitation). But see Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Jeff
Sessions Rescinds 25 Guidance Documents (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-generaljeff-sessions-rescinds-25-guidance-documents (rescinding the Obama-era advisory but the Trump “administration
declined to comment on whether it supports the imposition of such fees”).
48
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
49
See id. at 6.
50
Court expenses can include witness fees, transportation, cost of prosecution, and cost of court
operations.
51
In some states, youth or families are charged fees for public defenders even if they have been
determined indigent. Id.
52
Id. at 5.
53
Id. at 17.
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expenses.54 In some states, costs are not imposed at the trial level, but youth or
their families must pay for any appellate costs, creating a chilling effect on
appeals.55 Of the JLC survey respondents who reported being charged court
expenses, 65% indicated that difficulty paying caused problems, including debt,
additional court visits that lead to missed work or school, and the juvenile’s case
remaining open longer than it would have been, resulting in more fees.56
The second financial obligation that can be imposed on youth or their parents
is the cost of a public defender. Over fifty years ago, in Gideon v. Wainwright,57
the U.S. Supreme Court established that the U.S. Constitution affords all
defendants the right to counsel in state felony proceedings.58 The Court also held
that a criminal defendant who cannot afford an attorney must be provided one.59
Less than five years later, in In re Gault, the Court held that this right also
applied to youth in juvenile justice proceedings.60 However, across the United
States, this right is accompanied by “hefty price tags.”61 In the vast majority of
states, laws permit or require youth or their parents to pay for the cost of a courtappointed attorney.62 In some states, even families living in poverty or youth
determined to be indigent must pay this cost.63 Not only is the imposition of
public defender fees on indigent defendants unconstitutional, but state statutes
requiring youth offenders to pay public defender fees also inflict severe
consequences on juveniles who fail to pay these attorney’s fees.64 One public
defender and director of a Florida juvenile division wrote:
Besides adding financial and mental stress to the family, these fees and
costs often keep a child under supervision until they’re paid . . . even
if all other court sanctions have been satisfied. The longer the
probation or conditional release, the more likely there will be a
violation and further court proceedings . . . with more costs.65

54

Id.
Id.
56
Id.
57
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58
Id. at 344.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 336–37.
61
JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUVENILE LAW CTR., THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: THE HIGH COST OF “FREE”
COUNSEL FOR YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2018).
62
Id. at 7.
63
Id. at 6.
64
Id. at 10.
65
Id. (quoting Email from Rob Mason, Dir. of the Juvenile Div. of the Office of the Pub. Def., Fourth
Judicial Circuit, Fla., to Jessica Feierman (June 1, 2018)).
55
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These state statutes also impose severe consequences on juveniles’ families for
failure to pay. For example, in Wisconsin, parents’ debts can be sent to a
collections agency;66 in Minnesota, failure to pay can result in wage
garnishment;67 and in Florida and Oklahoma, parents who refuse appointed
counsel for their child can be held in contempt of court.68
The third type of fee is costs for evaluation or testing. Of the thirty states that
have statutes associated with costs of evaluations or testing, survey respondents
in twenty-six states reported youth or families making such payments.69 These
statutes relate to assessments generally, mental health evaluations, substance
abuse evaluations or assessments, DNA or blood tests, and HIV or sexually
transmitted infection (STI) tests.70 These are court-ordered evaluations, and
failure to obtain certain evaluations can result in denial of a bond, which means
the juvenile must remain in custody pending adjudication of their case.71 Thus,
the assessment of unpayable costs results in imprisoning juveniles for lack of
money. As discussed below, this de facto debtor’s prison is unconstitutional and
creates financial strain without serving any penological purpose. Rather than
force indigent juveniles and parents to pay these costs, the better policy is to
establish by statute that testing is paid for by the state or local entity.72
The fourth type of fee is a probation or supervision fee. Out of the twenty
states that have statutes associated with probation or supervision fees and costs,
survey respondents in eighteen states reported youth or families making these
payments.73 In twelve states, statutes impose probation or supervision fees or
costs on youth, whereas in seventeen states, statutes impose these fees on youths’
parents, although the parents may have had no role in their child’s delinquency.74
Probation and supervision fees are often assessed monthly, and failure to pay
each month can be treated as a violation of probation and result in its

66

Id.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.331(b) (West 2019).
68
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 10.
69
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 13–14 (reporting that there are thirty-one states with statutes
requiring or permitting costs associated with evaluations or testing, but this report was published before
California eliminated all fines and fees for youth offenders).
70
Id. at 14.
71
Overall, these statutes force juveniles to participate in evaluations, make juveniles pay for these
involuntary evaluations, and, if the juvenile is unable to get an evaluation because they are unable to pay, require
the juveniles to remain in confinement. Id. at 13.
72
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.8:01 (West 2014) (“The cost of such testing ordered by the court
shall be paid by the Commonwealth from funds appropriated to the Department for this purpose.”).
73
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 10–11.
74
Id. at 11.
67
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revocation.75 Additionally, youth or their families may be required to pay other
fees as a condition of probation.76 Failure to pay probation fees, or any fees that
are a condition of probation, may result in youth being placed in juvenile
detention.77 Thus, failure to pay, even if it is not willful, but rather due to a
juvenile’s or parent’s inability to pay, can result in a juvenile’s confinement.78
One respondent to JLC’s survey explained that if a juvenile cannot afford to pay
for treatment ordered while on probation, they are “often charged with a
probation violation, which results in a new sentence even though it’s not the
fault of the juvenile.”79 Another respondent noted that failure to pay probation
fees could result in a youth’s probation being extended, which could result in
additional probation violations.80
The fifth type of fee addressed is a fee related to informal adjustment or
diversion. Although only twenty-two states have statutes related to payment for
informal adjustment or diversion, according to JLC survey respondents, twentysix states impose these fees.81 Research has shown that youth who are diverted
out of the juvenile justice system and into diversion or informal adjustment
programs are less likely to recidivate than their counterparts who are formally
processed.82 Diversion and informal adjustment programs also allow youth to
avoid certain costs imposed throughout formal processing.83 In reality, fees for
these programs act as a gatekeeping mechanism, leading poorer youth to formal
processing and allowing wealthier youth to avoid system involvement.84 One
JLC survey respondent characterized diversion as “a privilege for those who are
privileged.”85
The sixth type of fee discussed is cost of care. In general, costs of care
include “the cost of child support, placement, programming, health care, and

75
Id. at 10 (first citing 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-615(10) (West 2019) (requiring a $50/month
supervision fee charged to youth or parents); and then citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-339 (West 2014)
(“Nonpayment of restitution, fines, or court costs may constitute a violation of probation.”)).
76
Id. (reporting that there are thirteen states with statutes imposing probation or supervision fees or costs
on youth, but this report was published before California eliminated all fines and fees for youth offenders).
77
Id.
78
See id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 12.
82
Holly A. Wilson & Robert D. Hoge, The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on Recidivism: A MetaAnalytic Review, 40 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 497, 504–09 (2012).
83
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 12.
84
Id.
85
Id.
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other support.”86 Of the forty-six states that have statutes that permit charging
parents for the care and support of their youth involved with the juvenile justice
system, survey respondents in thirty-one states reported youth and families
paying for the cost of care.87 Specifically, cost of care charges are composed of
expenses for “food, clothing, shelter and supervision of the child,”88 a child’s
custody,89 and detention,90 confinement,91 or placement in a facility.92
Additionally, many states have statutes requiring a youth or parent to pay for the
child’s physical or mental health care while the child is detained.93 If the youth
or parent is unable to pay for treatment, the child may be deprived of treatment,
be held for a violation of probation, or face prolonged periods of incarceration.94
One respondent to JLC’s survey stated that “if the family cannot pay for courtordered treatment, and does not have insurance that can pay, sometimes the
court-ordered treatment is simply not provided, leading to other complications
in the child’s behavior or increased seriousness of the child’s condition.”95 A
youth or parent’s inability to pay also runs the risk of youth remaining in
placement longer.96 If a family is unable to pay for community-based treatment,
then a judge may not release the child.97 While parents are responsible for the
cost of their child’s medical treatment when the child is living at home, imposing
these costs on parents when their child is in juvenile justice custody can raise
serious consequences, such as contempt orders, harming the parent and
juvenile.98
The seventh type of cost discussed is fines. Of the forty-two states that have
statutes that permit the imposition of fines on youth involved in the juvenile
86

Id. at 15.
Id. (reporting that there are forty-seven states with statutes on cost of care, but this report was published
before California eliminated all fines and fees for youth offenders).
88
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-243 (2018).
89
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 938.275 (West 2017).
90
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2704 (West 2017).
91
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3314-B (2017).
92
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-243 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.141 (West 2019); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.220 (West 2019).
93
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62B.110 (West 2019) (“If a child becomes subject to the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court and the child receives ancillary services that are administered or financed by a county,
including, but not limited to, transportation or psychiatric, psychological or medical services, the county is
entitled to reimbursement from the parent or guardian of the child.”); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-243(B)
(2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-602(d)(1)–(2) (West 2014).
94
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 15.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. (explaining that medication can be more expensive in the juvenile detention center, leading to
dangerous interruptions in a child’s medications).
87
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justice system, survey respondents in twenty-nine states reported youth or
families paying fines.99 The majority of states impose fines on youth, but a
significant number of states impose fines on parents who were involved in the
child’s delinquency.100 However, some states impose fines on the parents, even
without the requirement of parental responsibility, pushing accountability onto
and harming the uninvolved parent rather than disciplining the juvenile.101 The
imposition of a fine may seem like a better alternative to incarceration or costly
services, but because of the link between poverty and justice system
involvement, this imposition can often be problematic.102 An individual who is
unable to pay this fine may be incarcerated, whereas his or her wealthy
counterpart will avoid confinement.103
The imposition of these financial obligations can be burdensome and
unlawful. Not only are there an abundance of fines and fees imposed during and
after adjudication, but some of the costs described above, including court
expenses, public defender fees, and costs of evaluations and testing, may be
imposed before a court makes a delinquency determination.104 In addition, even
if a juvenile is not convicted, the youth or their family will not recoup the money
paid.105 Furthermore, in almost every state, youth and families are likely to pay
multiple costs for juvenile court involvement at numerous points in the
system.106 For example, in Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington, state statutes permit the imposition of at least seven
different categories of costs on youth or families.107 Additionally, within one
category of costs, an individual may be required to make multiple payments for
different purposes.108 For example, in some states where youth or families are
ordered to pay for the “cost of care,” a closer look at the statutes reveal they must
pay for the cost of placement and the cost of programming or treatment.109 Fines
and fees can be burdensome individually, but when considered cumulatively,
they may be overwhelming to financially stressed youth and families.110 Many
99
Id. at 18 (reporting that there are forty-three states with statutes on fines, but this report was published
before California eliminated all fines and fees for youth offenders).
100
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-111 (2013) (stating that parents can be punished for contributing to a
child’s delinquency).
101
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 18.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 5.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
See id. at 6.
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impoverished families cannot pay one of these fees, let alone seven different fees
at multiple times, without having to give up basic necessities.111 One report in
Alameda County, California, concluded that, for an average case, the total
fees112 to families for juvenile involvement added up to approximately
$2,000.113 If an individual is incarcerated for an extended period of time, then
these fees can increase significantly.114 For a single parent making federal
minimum wage, it would take almost two months’ salary to pay off the average
$2,000 in court-related costs.115
For a judge to lawfully impose a fine or fee, there must be a state statute;
however, the JLC report suggests that even in the absence of relevant statutes,
courts often impose these charges.116 Furthermore, in many instances where
fines or fees are discretionary under state law, they are frequently imposed.117
One survey respondent even reported that although the state statute requires
judges to assess an individual’s ability to pay particular costs, in practice all
individuals and families must pay regardless of their financial situation.118 The
abundance of fines and fees, the inconsistent and unlawful imposition of these
financial burdens, and the drastic consequences of these costs on impoverished
families are just a few reasons Congress should seize control from the states and
categorically ban fines and fees for youth offenders.
Additionally, the imposition of these financial obligations on youth
offenders and their families privatizes and individualizes state responsibility,
namely the criminal justice system. The state and its citizens choose to
adjudicate and potentially remove individuals from society; therefore,
collectively, society needs to bear the brunt of the fiscal costs associated with
this decision.119 Not only does the current scheme shift costs from the state onto
111

FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 6.
These fees included investigation, GPS monitoring, placement, and public defender fees.
113
Myles Bess, Double Charged: The True Co$t of Juvenile Justice, YOUTH RADIO (May 8, 2014),
https://youthradio.org/news/article/double-charged-nes-and-fees/.
114
Id.
115
The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). For a single parent making the
federal minimum wage, it would take approximately seven forty-hour work weeks, or 276 hours, to pay off costs
of $2,000.
116
See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 5.
117
See id. at 6.
118
Id. This categorical imposition is not only inconsistent with the state statute, but also contradicts the
intent of the state statute, which is to help impoverished families. STEPHANIE CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., U.C.
BERKELEY POLICY ADVOCACY CLINIC, MAKING FAMILIES PAY: THE HARMFUL, UNLAWFUL, AND COSTLY
PRACTICE OF CHARGING JUVENILE ADMINISTRATIVE FEES IN CALIFORNIA 16 (2017).
119
See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881,
892 (2009); Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate
the Excessive Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 328 (2014).
112
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youth offenders, but it also shifts responsibility onto uninvolved parents,
pushing accountability even further away from the state. The illogic in this
structure is amplified when the state takes custody of a child through
incarceration but continues forcing the individual or family to pay. Future
research should focus on the different circumstances under which the state takes
children away from parents. For example, in neglect and abuse cases it may be
logical to have the parents pay for their children’s care since the parents are at
fault, but when the state incarcerates a juvenile for the juvenile’s delinquent
activity, it seems unreasoned to force the uninvolved parents to pay for the
child’s care.
II. ELIMINATION OF FINES AND FEES FOR YOUTH OFFENDERS:
CASE STUDIES
Over the past five years, several states, cities, counties, and one Louisiana
parish have scaled back fines and fees for youth offenders.120 This cutback
included many California counties, which led to California becoming the first
state to eliminate fines and fees for youth offenders.121 This Part of the Comment
proceeds with a description of the repeal or suspension of fines and fees for
youth offenders in different California counties, the complete elimination of
these fines and fees in California, and the curtailing of these fines and fees in
other jurisdictions.
In 2016, Alameda County, California, was the first county in the state to
enact a full repeal of all fines and fees for youth offenders.122 In March 2016,
the Alameda County Board of Supervisors imposed an immediate moratorium
on all fees charged to parents with children in the juvenile justice system.123
Before the moratorium, Alameda County charged families a range of fees,
including “$25.29 per day for juvenile detention, $90 per month for probation
supervision, $15 per day for electronic monitoring, $28.68 per drug test, $250
per day for juvenile investigation, and $300 for legal representation.”124 This
moratorium offered relief of more than $2 million of debt to more than 2,900
families and shielded the thousands of families who pass through Alameda’s

120
Chief Judge Candice Bates-Anderson, Orleans Parish Juvenile Court, Standing Policy on Juvenile
Administrative Fees (June 20, 2018), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/12/OrleansParish-Juvenile-Fees-2018.07.19.pdf; Wiltz, supra note 16.
121
S. 190, 2017 Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
122
Alameda County Halts Juvenile Probation Fees, E. BAY COMMUNITY L. CTR. (Apr. 7, 2016), https://
ebclc.org/in-the-news/alameda-county-halts-juvenile-probation-fees/.
123
Id.
124
CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 20.
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juvenile courts every year.125 Even Alameda County Chief Public Defender
Brendon Woods, whose office could have lost tens of thousands of dollars
because of the moratorium, supported the cessation, saying: “The Board of
Supervisors deserves tremendous credit for recognizing that an existing county
policy was harming families, and taking swift action to correct the problem.”126
The moratorium was the result of efforts led by the University of California
Berkeley School of Law Policy Advocacy Clinic127 and the East Bay
Community Law Center.128 In 2014, on behalf of the East Bay Community Law
Center and various advocates, the Policy Advocacy Clinic began exploring
juvenile justice fines and fees across California.129 The Clinic focused on
Alameda County because it was one of the few counties to charge all fee types,
including an investigation fee that was not authorized by state law.130 In 2015,
the Clinic presented its findings to the Public Protection Committee of the Board
of Supervisors, noting the high harms of these fees, including their
disproportionate effect on youth of color, and the low financial gain to the county
from these fees.131 Following this presentation, two supervisors wrote a letter to
the full Board of Supervisors proposing the moratorium.132 In the letter, the two
supervisors noted that many youth and families struggle to pay these fees, and
“[i]mposing this kind of debt on families induces economic and familial
instability, which undermines the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile
system.”133 The letter also mentioned the severe consequences of these fees,
including parents’ wages being garnished, bank accounts being levied, and tax
refunds being intercepted.134 Subsequently, the Board of Supervisors voted
unanimously to impose an immediate moratorium on all juvenile fines and
fees.135 Three months later, Alameda County became the first county in
California to enact a full repeal of all juvenile fees.136

125

Id. at 21; Alameda County Halts Juvenile Probation Fees, supra note 122.
Alameda County Halts Juvenile Probation Fees, supra note 122.
127
Referred to in this Comment as “Policy Advocacy Clinic.”
128
Alameda County Halts Juvenile Probation Fees, supra note 122.
129
Campos-Bui, supra note 18.
130
Id.
131
Minutes of Alameda County Board of Supervisors’ Public Protection Committee, ACGOV.ORG (Oct. 8,
2015), https://www.acgov.org/board/com_calendar/documents/Public_Protection_October_8_2015_minutesI.
pdf.
132
Campos-Bui, supra note 18.
133
Letter from Richard Valle, Supervisor, & Keith Carson, Supervisor, to Board of Supervisors (Mar. 16,
2016).
134
Id.
135
Alameda County, Cal., Resolution No. 2016-66, (Mar. 29, 2016).
136
Alameda County, Cal., Ordinance No. 2016-35 (July 12, 2016).
126
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In response to Alameda County’s full repeal, in 2016, Californian Counties
Contra Costa and Santa Clara both imposed moratoriums ending the assessment
and collection of fees for youth offenders.137 The year before these moratoriums,
Santa Clara County spent almost $450,000 to collect less than $400,000 in fines
and fees from youth and their families.138 In January 2017, Santa Clara County
repealed all ordinances that allowed the assessment and collection of juvenile
administrative fees.139 Alameda, Contra Costa, and Santa Clara Counties joined
Los Angeles County, which issued a moratorium on fees in 2009, and San
Francisco County, which had never charged fees.140 By the end of 2017,
Sacramento, Solano, and Sonoma Counties had all reduced or ended juveniles
fees.141
Following suit, in January 2018, the state of California became the first state
to entirely eliminate fines and fees for youth offenders.142 In January 2017, State
Senator Holly J. Mitchell of Los Angeles and State Senator Ricardo Lara of Bell
Gardens introduced Senate Bill 190, which was co-sponsored by a dozen
community groups.143 To help raise awareness about the bill and the national
issue, youth offenders and their families made short videos144 and testified about
the effect of fees on the youth’s well-being and their families in general.145 In
addition to this testimony, researchers from the Policy Advocacy Clinic and
PolicyLink146 testified about the benefits to families and the low economic effect
on county budgets of a fee repeal.147

137
Contra Costa County, Cal., Resolution No. 2016/606 (Oct. 25, 2016). Prior to this moratorium, Contra
Costa County charged families of youth who were held in juvenile detention but were later found not guilty.
Sukey Lewis, Will California Counties Rethink Charging Parents Fees for Locked p Kids, KQED NEWS
(Oct. 24, 2016), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2016/10/24/many-california-counties-charge-parents-high-feeswhile-kids-are-locked-up/. Santa Clara County, Cal., Res. No. BOS-2016-110 (June 21, 2016).
138
Santa Clara County, Cal., Res. No. BOS-2016-110 (June 21, 2016).
139
Santa Clara County, Cal., Res. No. BOS-2017-6 (Jan. 24, 2017).
140
Brooke Pinnix, California Bill to End Crippling Administrative Fees in the Juvenile System, CHRON.
SOC. CHANGE (Mar. 13, 2017), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/news-2/california-bill-to-end-cripplingadministrative-fees-for-juveniles-in-the-justice-system.
141
Id.
142
S. 190, 2017 Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
143
Id.
144
RYSE Center, Support SB 190 to Stop Fees that Punish Youth and Families: Mariana’s Story,
YOUTUBE (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smj4BGQIgnE&t=48s.
145
California Senate Democrats, Sen. Holly J. Mitchell on Why SB 190 Is Needed to End Unfair Fees on
Innocent Juveniles, YOUTUBE (June 28, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYMqGE4ilQQ.
146
PolicyLink is a research and action institute which advances racial and economic equity. About Us,
POLICYLINK, http://www.policylink.org/about-us (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).
147
Campos-Bui, supra note 18; California Legislative Information, Assembly Appropriations Committee,
CALCHANNEL (Aug. 23, 2017), http://calchannel.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=7&clip_id=4915&
meta_id=216293.
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Despite all of the testimony and data supporting the bill, some legislators
remained concerned with the effect Senate Bill 190 would have on counties.148
Some opponents argued that fines and fees for youth offenders helped counties
recoup their costs; however, the effectiveness of these fines and fees was
oversold since many youth offenders and their families could not afford to pay
these costs.149 The Policy Advocacy Clinic found that in fiscal year 2014–2015,
Alameda County spent $250,938 to collect $419,830 in juvenile administrative
fees, netting only $168,892.150 In addition to this net gain being substantially
low when compared to the amount of fees the county charged, this net gain was
also negligible compared to Alameda’s $2.74 billion budget, comprising a mere
6/1000ths of a percent.151
The bill’s co-sponsors knew that a compromise would be offered involving
a fix to existing ability-to-pay provisions in counties’ statutes; however, the cosponsors decided early in the campaign that justice would not be served by
simply revising these provisions.152 Research conducted by the Policy Advocacy
Clinic found that no single county in California could claim its fee practices were
fair and cost-effective.153 Some counties improperly billed impoverished
families and netted little revenue, while other counties fairly assessed families’
inability to pay but procured even less revenue.154 Thus, when the bill’s cosponsors were offered a compromise regarding the revision of ability-to-pay
provisions, the co-sponsors and authors declined.155
Regardless of some legislators’ apprehension, nine months after the bill was
introduced, it was approved by the California State Legislature.156 On October
11, 2017, Governor Jerry Brown signed the bill, which became effective January
1, 2018.157 The law repealed state law authorizing counties to charge
administrative fees to parents or guardians for their children’s detention, legal
representation, probation supervision, electronic monitoring, and drug testing.158
Although California is still early in the implementation phase, preliminary
results seem promising. By April 2018, all counties had formally ended fee
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Campos-Bui, supra note 18.
Pinnix, supra note 140.
SELBIN, supra note 31, at 12.
Pinnix, supra note 140.
Campos-Bui, supra note 18.
CAMPOS-BUI, supra note 118, at 2.
Campos-Bui, supra note 18.
Id.
S. 190, 2017 Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).
Id.
Id.
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assessments,159 which was not a small feat given the state’s population of
approximately 39 million people.160 Additionally, although Senate Bill 190 only
required counties to end juvenile assessment, by April 2018, at least twenty-two
counties had also halted fee collection and none had reported any negative
consequences.161 As of April 2018, those twenty-two counties had waived more
than 190,000 accounts which totaled more than $200 million.162 Although
Senate Bill 190 did not require refunds, Contra Costa County took the lead in
“refunding families for payments made on fees that were unlawfully
assessed.”163 California set the stage for a more just and effective juvenile justice
system, proving that the elimination of fines and fees can be accomplished
without financial harm.
In addition to California, the states of Washington and Utah, the city of
Philadelphia, and the Orleans Parish of Louisiana are among a handful of
jurisdictions that have scaled back fines and fees for youth offenders.164 In 2015
in Washington the state legislature passed the Year Act, eliminating most nonrestitution fines and fees allowed under Washington statutes.165 The Year Act
also allows juveniles with existing fines and fees to petition the court for
modification or relief from fines, fees, and interest and directs judges to consider
factors such as an individual’s ability to pay juvenile diversion fees, juvenile
court and appellate costs, collection fees for juvenile financial obligations,
adjudication fees, and certain fines.166
In 2017, Utah passed House Bill 239, capping how much juveniles can be
charged. The Bill stated that the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice
and the Administrative Office of the Courts would work together to create “a
statewide sliding scale for the assessment of fines, fees, and restitution, based on
the ability of the minor’s family to pay.”167 However, the Bill also noted that
“the court may enforce orders of fines, fees or restitution through garnishments,
wage withholdings, supplementary proceedings, or executions.”168

159

Campos-Bui, supra note 18.
State Population Totals and Components of Change: 2010-2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/state-total.html#par_textimage_1574439295.
161
Campos-Bui, supra note 18.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
See Chief Judge Candice Bates-Anderson, supra note 120; Wiltz, supra note 16;
165
S. 5564, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
166
Id.
167
H.R. 239, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40(1)(f) (Utah 2017).
168
Id. § 70(4).
160
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In March 2017, the city of Philadelphia announced that it would stop
charging parents for their child’s incarceration.169 Before the shift, parents were
being billed up to $1,000 a month to pay for their child’s stay at a juvenile
detention center, even though some families could only afford to pay $5 per
month and the financial benefit to the city was minimal.170 For example, in the
fiscal year of 2016, Philadelphia netted $551,261 from parents of delinquent
children, which was a small fraction of the $81,148,521 the city spent on
delinquent placements.171
In June 2018, the Orleans Parish Juvenile Court ended the assessment and
collection of discretionary juvenile fees in delinquency cases, becoming the first
jurisdiction in the South to take such action.172 In a resolution signed by Chief
Judge Candice Bates-Anderson adopting the new policy, the Court cited to
“researchers, policymakers, and the National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges” who all found that “juvenile administrative fees undermine
rehabilitation and public safety.”173 The resolution notes that the new policy
“will allow the Court to better serve the youth of Orleans Parish, their families,
and the community” and encourages other Louisiana parishes to end the
imposition of juvenile administrative fees.174
While the elimination or reduction of fines and fees for youth offenders in
these individual cities and counties is a move in the right direction, more must
be done to protect youth and their families. If a youth offender or their family is
unable to pay their court costs, then the juvenile may be left without treatment,
refused representation, or incarcerated, and the parents may be held in contempt
of court.175 These consequences are too severe for society to wait for every
county, city, or state to eliminate its fines and fees for youth offenders; thus, the
entire nation should follow California’s lead, and Congress should eliminate all
fines and fees for youth offenders.
169
Eli Hager, Philadelphia Ends Practice of Billing Parents for the Time Their Children Spend in
Detention, WASH. POST (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/03/03/
philadelphia-ends-practice-of-billing-parents-for-the-time-their-children-spend-in-detention/?utm_term=.3dd9
77e9fb05.
170
Id.
171
Hager, supra note 23.
172
Chief Judge Candice Bates-Anderson, supra note 120.
173
Id. (first citing NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOLUTION ADDRESSING
FINES, FEES, AND COSTS IN JUVENILE COURTS (2018); then citing FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 12; then
citing CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 20; and then citing Alex Piquero & Wesley Jennings, Research
Note: Justice System-Imposed Financial Penalties Increase the Likelihood of Recidivism in a Sample of
Adolescent Offenders, 13 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 325 (2017)).
174
Chief Judge Candice Bates-Anderson, supra note 120.
175
See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 10.

SHAPIRO_8.21.20

1324

8/24/2020 2:29 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1305

III. LEGAL REASONS TO ELIMINATE FINES AND FEES FOR
YOUTH OFFENDERS
The imposition of fines and fees on youth offenders should be eliminated for
three legal reasons. First, the imposition of fines and fees on youth offenders
violates the holding in Bearden that a local government can only imprison a
person for not paying a fine if it can be shown that the person willfully chose not
to pay even though they could have paid, raising concerns of stare decisis and
vertical federalism.176 Because of the vague holding in Bearden,177 Congress
should implement bright-line criteria for judges to use when determining
whether an individual is indigent versus willfully refusing to pay court-ordered
fines and fees, categorically labeling juveniles as indigent. Second, both
“excessive” and “fine” in the Eighth Amendment were incorrectly interpreted
by the Supreme Court based on limited historical sources.178 Under the correct
interpretations, “excessive” should be addressed through an understanding of
proportionality that accounts for the offense, offender’s characteristics, and
effect the fine would have on the individual.179 Thus, most fines and fees on
juveniles would automatically be deemed excessive because of juveniles’ lack
of resources and the concern of placing youth in a lifelong cycle of debt. Third,
some applications of state statutes unlawfully include charging fees that are not
authorized in the juvenile setting or fees that exceed statutory maximums.180
Rather than try to seek out every unlawful application of a state statute, Congress
should categorically eliminate all fines and fees for youth offenders.
A. Debtors’ Prison and the Misapplication of Bearden
The use of imprisonment to collect debts dates back 3,000 years.181 In early
Rome, if a debtor failed to pay their debt in thirty days, the creditor could place
him under house arrest for another thirty days.182 If the debtor failed to pay after
the full sixty days, the creditor could sell the debtor into slavery.183 These and
other European laws influenced colonial law in America. In 1641, one colony’s
General Court ruled that “anyone who failed to pay a private debt could be kept
in jail at his own expense until the debt was paid,” which resulted in people
176

Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Id. at 672.
178
Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CAL. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (2014).
179
See id. at 278.
180
CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 2.
181
John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
439, 445 (2005).
182
Id.
183
Id.
177
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dying in prison for the crime of their indigence.184 Eventually, federal debtors’
prisons were abolished in 1833, leaving the power in the hands of the states.185
Subsequently, during the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held in three
separate cases that incarcerating those too poor to repay their debt was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.186
In 1970, in Williams v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that if a person
cannot afford to pay a fine, it is unconstitutional to convert that fine into jail time
automatically.187 Only one year later, the Court held in Tate v. Short that it is a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to convert a
fine to jail time simply because a person cannot pay the fine.188 Yet citizens are
routinely jailed for failing to repay debt.189 Additionally, in 1983, in Bearden,
the Supreme Court held that incarcerating indigent debtors was unconstitutional
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.190 The Supreme
Court’s decision “compelled local judges to distinguish between debtors who
are too poor to pay and those who have the financial ability but ‘willfully’
refuse” to pay.191 Although de jure debtors’ prisons have been abolished in every
state,192 de facto debtors’ prison is prevalent, against the Supreme Court’s
holding in Bearden,193 and has grave consequences for youth offenders and their
families.194
In Bearden, Danny Bearden pleaded guilty, and the trial court sentenced him
to three years on probation.195 As a condition of probation, Bearden was ordered

184
Robert A. Freer, Imprisonment for Debt in Massachusetts Before 1800, 46 MISS. VALLEY HIS. REV.
252, 253 (1961). Additionally, in some American colonies, creditors could sell indigent debtors into indentured
servitude. Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 181, at 445.
185
Devon Douglas-Bowers, The History of America’s Debtors’ Prisons: The Shackles Return,
GLOBALRESEARCH (Nov. 1, 2014), https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-history-of-americas-debtors-prisons-theshackles-return/5411258.
186
See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (ruling that a
defendant may not be jailed solely because he/she is too indigent to pay a fine); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235 (1970) (deciding that a maximum prison term could not be extended due to the defendant’s failure to pay
court costs and fees).
187
Williams, 399 U.S. at 243.
188
Tate, 401 U.S. at 397.
189
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 23.
190
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667.
191
Eli Hager, Debtors’ Prisons, Then and Now: FAQ, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 24, 2015), https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2015/02/24/debtors-prisons-then-and-now-faq.
192
Mitchell & Kunsch, supra note 181, at 446.
193
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667–68.
194
Hager, supra note 191.
195
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 662.
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to pay $250 in restitution and a $500 fine.196 Bearden borrowed money and paid
the first $200; however, about a month later, he was laid off from his job.197
Bearden repeatedly tried to find other work but was unable to, losing the ability
to raise any income.198 Before the balance was due, Bearden notified the
probation office he would be late with his payment.199 Three months later, the
state filed a petition in court to revoke Bearden’s probation for failure to pay.200
After a hearing, the trial court revoked Bearden’s probation, entered a
conviction, and sentenced Bearden to serve the remaining portion of his
probation in prison.201 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split
over whether revoking the probation of indigents for failure to pay fines violates
the Equal Protection Clause.202
In analyzing this issue, the Court in Bearden examined the holdings in both
Williams and Tate.203 The findings in these cases indicated that the state could
not “[impose] a fine as a sentence and then automatically [convert] it into a jail
term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine
in full.”204 Alternatively, if the state determines a fine or restitution is the
appropriate penalty for a crime, it may not subsequently imprison a person solely
because he or she lacks the resources to pay.205 Both Williams206 and Tate207
differentiated this limitation on the imprisonment of indigents from a situation
where a defendant was at fault for his or her failure to pay.208 This distinction
was critical in the Bearden holding.209 There, the Court held that “in revocation
proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sentencing court must
inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.”210 The Court ruled that if a
probationer “willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona fide
efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke
probation.”211 However, if the probationer was unable to pay despite bona fide
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Id.
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663–64.
Id. at 667.
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 n.19 (1970).
Tate, 401 U.S. at 400.
See Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668.
Id.
Id. at 672.
Id.
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efforts, the court must consider alternative punishments.212 A court may
imprison a probationer who made sufficient bona fide efforts only if alternative
measures are inadequate to meet the interests in punishment and deterrence.213
The three holdings from Williams,214 Tate,215 and Bearden216 result in a rule that
if the state determines a fine, restitution, or probation is the appropriate and
adequate penalty for a crime, it may not subsequently imprison a person,
possibly by revoking his or her probation, solely because he or she lacked the
resources to pay. However, these holdings have been overlooked in general and,
in particular, with regard to cases involving juveniles.
Under certain state statutes, judges now imprison juveniles for fines and fees
they are unable to pay, effectively punishing them for their family’s poverty.
Some state laws explicitly establish that youth offenders or their family may be
incarcerated for failure to pay their fines and fees,217 disregarding the Supreme
Court’s holdings in Williams218 and Tate.219 Other state statutes establish that
youth offenders who fail to pay may have their probation revoked,220 ignoring
the holding in Bearden.221 Furthermore, other state statutes specify that juveniles
who fail to pay may “be turned away from diversion programs or be held in
contempt of court,”222 ignoring the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Bearden that
it was “fundamentally unfair” to imprison an indigent citizen.223 Following the
holdings in Williams,224 Tate,225 and Bearden,226 these state statutes and their
applications are both unlawful and harmful. These cases stand for the idea that
a person cannot be imprisoned because they are unable to pay a debt.227
However, these state statutes ignore that proposition and the core values of the
juvenile justice system. The juvenile justice system was created to focus on
rehabilitation and improved outcomes for youth offenders, but, by reawakening

212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

Id.
Id.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
Williams, 399 U.S. at 243.
Tate, 401 U.S. at 397.
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668–69.
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971).
Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672.
See id.; Tate, 401 U.S. at 397; Williams, 399 U.S. at 243.
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debtors’ prison for juveniles, these state statutes focus more on punishment for
a juvenile’s inability to pay than restoration.228
Although debtors’ imprisonment is unconstitutional, the main reason de
facto debtors’ imprisonment still occurs is because neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress has ever defined when nonpayment is due to indigency or
willfulness, leading to inconsistent results. By leaving this mens rea
determination to individual judges, the Supreme Court left open the possibility
that a judge with high standards of “indigence” could circumvent the spirit of
Bearden and send a poor debtor to prison.229 Additionally, judges have different
criteria for determining whether a debtor is willfully neglecting his or her
debt.230 For example, some judges will determine nonpayment to be willful,
unless the debtor proves they exhausted all other sources of income, including
“quitting smoking, collecting and returning used soda cans and bottles, and
asking family and friends for loans.”231 Congress needs to provide bright-line
criteria as to how a judge is supposed to determine whether a debtor is indigent
or, rather, is willfully refusing to pay. Within these criteria, Congress must take
into consideration the unique needs and circumstances of juveniles. Three
reasons require this unique consideration: (1) compulsory education and labor
laws; (2) the effect of this determination on youths’ families; and (3) the
Supreme Court’s repeated warning that constitutional protections must be
adjusted to the unique developmental needs of adolescents.
The first reason juveniles require unique attention is because of compulsory
education and labor laws. Compulsory education laws force juveniles to attend
school for an average of 6.64 hours a day until they reach a certain age,
prohibiting youth from working and generating an income during those hours.232
Labor laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), restrict the number
of hours youth can work and list hazardous occupations that are too dangerous
for juveniles.233 For example, under the FLSA, permissible work hours for
fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds are three hours on a school day, eighteen hours
in a school week, eight hours on a nonschool day, forty hours in a nonschool

228

See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
Hager, supra note 191.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Average Number of Hours in the School Day and Average Number of Days in the School Year for
Public School, by State: 2007–08, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/tables/
sass0708_035_s1s.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).
233
29 U.S.C. § 212 (2012); The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, As Amended, U.S. DEP’T LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/FairLaborStandAct.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2020).
229
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week, and between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m.234 The combination of these occupational
restrictions, plus the gap between federal minimum wage and the average
amount of fines and fees a youth offender must pay, makes most youth offenders
indigent. If a juvenile who is fourteen or fifteen can only work three hours on a
school day and eight hours on a nonschool day, then during the average week,
the juvenile will only be able to work thirty-one hours. If a juvenile works all
thirty-one hours, then if they are making the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per
hour, they will make roughly $224 per week, before taxes.235 However, this does
not account for the FLSA provision that states juveniles can only work eighteen
hours in a school week.236 Even if that provision is ignored and all of a juvenile’s
income went to paying court fines and fees, then, in the average case, a juvenile
would have to work almost nine weeks to pay all of those costs. This is also
dependent on whether the juvenile can find a job. Recently, significant numbers
of teenagers have been shut out of the labor market, making this task more
difficult.237 This is particularly true of youth living in poverty, who usually have
more difficulty finding employment than their affluent peers and often work to
support their family’s financial needs.238 Furthermore, even if Congress could
ensure opportunities to work, that may create new problems. Forcing youth to
work too much may lead to long-term negative consequences, including lower
grades and higher school dropout rates.239 Juveniles from more disadvantaged
backgrounds also tend to work longer hours, heightening these negative

234
Work Hours, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/youthlabor/workhours (last visited
Apr. 8, 2020).
235
Under 29 U.S.C. § 206, the federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
236
Work Hours, supra note 234.
237
One recent study found that the number of jobs held by teenagers between ages fourteen and eighteen
shrank by 33% between 2001 and 2014. CAREERBUILDER, THE CHANGING FACE OF U.S. JOBS: COMPOSITION OF
OCCUPATIONS BY GENDER, RACE, AND AGE FROM 2001–2004, at 13 (2015). Another study found that the youth
employment rate in 2011 was 26%, the lowest since World War II. JP MORGAN CHASE & CO., BUILDING SKILLS
THROUGH SUMMER JOBS: LESSONS FROM THE FIELD 4 (2015). Teens seeking jobs are now in competition with
college graduates, workers over fifty-five, and others competing for the same entry-level roles. Andrew Soergel,
Why Teens Are Getting Shut Out of the Workforce, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 26, 2015, 4:30 PM), http://
www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/03/26/studies-suggest-teens-getting-shut-out-of-workforce.
238
According to one report, only 21% of teenagers from low-income families worked at all, while 38% of
wealthier teens had jobs. ANDREW SUM ET AL., CTR. FOR LABOR MKT. STUDIES AT NE. UNIV., THE DISMAL
STATE OF THE NATION’S TEEN SUMMER JOB MARKET, 2008–2012, AND THE EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK FOR THE
SUMMER OF 2013, at 4 (2013).
239
According to one study, youth who work more than twenty hours a week “may have lower grade point
averages and are more likely to drop out of school than those who work fewer hours.” CHILD TRENDS DATA
BANK, YOUTH EMPLOYMENT: INDICATORS ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 2 (2015).
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consequences.240 Fines and fees that push juveniles into such work experiences,
therefore, undercut the juvenile justice system’s rehabilitative goals.241
The second reason juveniles require distinct consideration is because of the
effect of these fines and fees on their families. Although neither the Supreme
Court nor Congress has held juveniles to be categorically indigent, many states
have realized that juveniles usually lack the resources to pay their own fines and
fees. Thus, some state statutes include language indicating juveniles will be
charged based on what their parents can pay,242 or some statutes simply require
the family pay rather than the youth.243 For example, many state statutes make
youth access to counsel contingent on their family’s financial status.244
Requiring a youth’s family to pay their fines and fees transfers responsibility for
a juvenile’s action onto their family members who may be unable or unwilling
to fulfill the obligation. If a family is unable to fulfill the responsibility, then the
youth offender may be left without treatment, refused representation, or
incarcerated for an extended period of time, and the parents may be, among other
things, held in contempt of court.245 Families and parents should not be forced
to pay for their child’s actions, and juveniles should not be at the mercy of their
parents’ willingness to pay. If fees and fines are being pushed onto parents and
families simply because juveniles lack the resources to pay, the better solution
is to eliminate these payments, especially if juveniles’ right to counsel could be
at stake.246 The juvenile justice system was created to help improve a youth
offender’s life once released from the system, to teach juveniles responsibility,
and to deter them from future delinquent acts.247 However, by imposing these
fines and fees onto a juvenile’s families, wealthy youth will learn nothing, and

240
Id. (“Some studies show that longer work hours are more prevalent among minority and other
disadvantaged students.”).
241
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 7.
242
Julie Miller, Even Indigent Families Must Pay for Their Child’s Attorney in Most States, JUV. JUST.
INFO. EXCHANGE (Aug. 14, 2018), https://jjie.org/2018/08/14/even-indigent-families-must-pay-for-their-childsattorney-in-most-states-report-says/.
243
See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 5.
244
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 61, at 5 (raising a number of concerns: “(1) The investigation into parents’
incomes can be lengthy . . . ; (2) the investigation can stir fear in families . . . which can influence a child’s
decision to waive counsel . . . ; (3) some parents have incomes that fall just above the eligibility threshold, but
they are not truly capable of paying for counsel . . . ; (4) some parents who are ineligible may decide not to hire
an attorney, even if they can afford one, forcing the child to navigate the system alone; and (5) if parents incur
the cost of representation, there is potential for conflict between the juvenile defender’s loyalty to the child and
perception of loyalty to the parents”).
245
Id. at 10.
246
See id. (discussing the constitutional issues with making youth access to counsel contingent on his or
her parent).
247
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
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poorer youth will suffer. Additionally, pushing this responsibility onto parents
can cause strain between the juvenile and their family and can force families to
decide between paying fines and fees or buying necessities.248
A final reason Congress should take into consideration the distinctive needs
and circumstances of juveniles is to follow the Supreme Court’s lead. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly discussed the need for constitutional
protections to be calibrated to the unique needs of adolescents. In 2005, the
Supreme Court started to take notice of psychological research regarding the
brain development of juveniles, when attorneys in Roper v. Simmons249
referenced behavioral science in oral argument.250 One amicus curiae brief for
the case, written by the American Psychological Association (APA), referenced
numerous studies showing that adolescents often lack the ability to make mature
judgments, control their impulses, and consider the consequences of their
actions.251 Citing this brief, the Court ruled that Simmons, who was accused of
committing first-degree murder at age seventeen, could not receive the death
penalty.252 This research was again referenced by the Supreme Court in the 2010
case Graham v. Florida,253 in which Graham, age seventeen, had been sentenced
to life in prison for violating his probation.254 The Court noted that “parts of the
brain involved in behavior control continue to mature late through adolescence”
and held that life without parole was unconstitutional for individuals under the
age of eighteen who were convicted of crimes other than homicide.255 Then in
2012, in Miller v. Alabama,256 the Court held that states could not automatically
sentence juveniles to life without parole even if they were convicted of
homicide.257 The Court referenced a revised version of the APA’s amicus brief
and stated that the science had become stronger showing that “adolescent brains
are not yet fully mature in regions and systems related to higher-order executive
functions such as impulse control, planning ahead and risk avoidance.”258 Most
recently, in 2016, the Court applied the Miller259 rule retroactively, holding that
248

The policy issue of pushing fines and fees onto families is discussed below. See infra Part IV.C.
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
250
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
251
Brief for American Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
252
Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
253
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
254
Id. at 57.
255
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
256
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
257
Id.
258
Id. at 477 (noting some hallmark features of a juveniles as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences.”).
259
Id.
249
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prisoners previously given automatic life sentences with no possibility of parole
for crimes committed as juveniles must have their cases reviewed.260 The Court
again addressed how “children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing,” noting that these differences result from juvenile’s
“diminished culpability.”261
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that adolescent brains are not
fully mature and that constitutional protections must be adjusted for juveniles.262
This adjustment must reach fines and fees for juveniles. Juveniles and their
families are being charged excessive amounts for an act committed by an
individual whose brain has not developed in regions related to higher-order
executive functions.263 Courts are sentencing juveniles and their families to a
life of debt for a crime committed by a category of persons whom the Supreme
Court has repeatedly explained need unique constitutional protections because
of their lack of brain maturity.264 If juveniles or their families cannot pay these
fees, juveniles can be incarcerated, effectively imprisoning them for their
indigence.265 Debtors’ prison has already been deemed unconstitutional,266 but
more must be done to protect vulnerable juveniles. Congress must create brightline criteria to determine whether a person is indigent or willfully refusing to
pay court-ordered fines and fees. In these criteria, protections must be given to
juveniles, so they are not fined excessively, possibly incarcerated, or forced into
a lifelong cycle of debt for a crime committed when their brain was not fully
developed.
Problematic policies on fines and fees create modern-day debtors’ prisons.
Some state laws explicitly allow youth or their families to be incarcerated for
failure to pay, while others establish that youth who fail to pay may have
probation revoked, be held in contempt of court, or be denied acceptance into a
diversion program.267 The imposition of such serious penalties, including loss of
liberty, for failing to pay fines and fees raises serious legal concerns.

260

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
Id. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471).
262
Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. 718; Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
263
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 471–72.
264
See Miller, 567 U.S. 460; Graham, 560 U.S. 48; Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
265
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 15.
266
See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661–62 (1983).
267
See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
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SHAPIRO_8.21.20

2020]

8/24/2020 2:29 PM

CRIPPLING COSTS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

1333

B. Incorrect Interpretation of “Excessive” and “Fine”
The second major legal concern related to the imposition of fines and fees
on youth offenders relates to the incorrect interpretations of “excessive” and
“fine” within the Excessive Fines Clause in the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”268 In 2019, in Timbs v. Indiana, the Supreme Court incorporated the
Excessive Fines Clause against the states.269 Following this recent decision, the
correct interpretations of “excessive” and “fine” became even more important to
ensure consistent and just results across the country.270
When interpreting the Excessive Fines Clause, the Supreme Court restricts
fines “to sanctions that are punitive in nature and paid exclusively to the
government”271 and reads excessive to mean, “either exclusively or primarily,
the proportionality between the crime’s gravity and the amount of the fine.”272
These definitions place many economic sanctions beyond the Clause’s reach and
suggest that real-world consequences of fines should be ignored.273 The
interpretations have also created disorder in the lower courts.274 Furthermore,
the Court only relied on a limited set of historical sources275 when it interpreted
the Clause. If the Court were to consider the entire historical record and update
its interpretations, or if Congress were to enact a federal statute reinterpreting
the Excessive Fines Clause after accounting for the entire historical record, then
268

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
139 S. Ct. 682 (2019).
270
See Eugene Volokh, Does the Excessive Fines Clause Apply to the States?, REASON: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Mar. 5, 2018), https://reason.com/volokh/2018/03/05/does-the-excessive-fines-clause-apply-to
(discussing why the Eighth Amendment is important to the everyday lives of many Americans).
271
Colgan, supra note 178, at 277.
272
Id.
273
Id. at 295.
274
United States v. Aguasvivas-Castillo, 668 F.3d 7, 17 (1st Cir. 2012) (interpreting the excessive analysis
to include consideration of “whether the defendant falls into the class of persons at whom the criminal statute
was principally directed”); United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A] court should also
consider whether forfeiture would deprive a defendant of his or her livelihood.”); Von Hofe v. United States,
492 F.3d 175, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2007) (using a hybrid of the considerations mandated in sister circuits for its
excessive analysis and considering the relationship between the property and the offense); United States v.
$100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting the excessive analysis to
include consideration of “the nature and extent of the crime [and] whether the violation was related to other
illegal activities”); United States v. Sigillito, 899 F. Supp. 2d 850, 866 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (considering only
whether forfeiture was grossly disproportional to the offense); State v. Cottrell, 271 P.3d 1243, 1250–51, 1254
(Idaho Ct. App. 2012) (relying on Bajakajian in holding that restitution for officer’s injury was not a fine because
it was remedial); State v. Good, 100 P.3d 644, 649 (Mont. 2004) (holding restitution is at least partly punitive
and thus a fine).
275
Colgan, supra note 178, at 277.
269
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the new interpretations would likely result in a categorical ban on fines and fees
for juveniles. Additionally, the new interpretations would lead to more
consistent results in all court decisions.
The four cases276 that serve as a basis for the Excessive Fines doctrine rest
on historical interpretation. The early history of the use of and limitations on
monetary punishments extends back to “ancient Hebrew’s lex talionis, as well
as early systems of the pre-Norman England Anglos and Saxons, which
prescribed exact” punishments for a specific wrongdoing.277 These systems gave
way to amercements, which were financial penalties assessed by juries for civil
and criminal wrongdoing; however, many commentators treated them as civil
penalties.278 The Magna Carta prohibited amercements that were
disproportionate to the offense or that would impoverish the wrongdoer,
curtailing their abuse.279 In contrast, fines were initially voluntary offerings to
the king; however, over time, fines morphed into required payments to secure
release from imprisonment.280 Because all economic sanctions were rendered
involuntary, the terms fines and amercements merged into simply fines.281 Thus,
scholars reasoned the subsequent prohibition on excessive fines in the English
Bill of Rights282 included both criminal and civil economic sanctions.283
While scholars explored the relevant English history in earnest by the 1980s,
little was known about the American experience, partly because the Supreme
Court had not taken a case regarding the Clause.284 It was not until 1989, in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,285 that the
Supreme Court attempted to interpret the Clause. Although the Browning-Ferris
majority noted that the proper method for interpreting the Excessive Fines
Clause was to assess the historical record to determine how the Clause’s terms
were understood at ratification, it rejected the historical interpretations reached
by the academic community.286 Rather, the Court determined historical
considerations mandated a narrow definition of fine, limited to “payment to a
276
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604
(1993); Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 546–47 (1993); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989).
277
Colgan, supra note 178, at 296.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 296–97.
280
Id. at 297.
281
Id.
282
Bill of Rights of 1689, 1 W. & M. Sess. 2 c. 2 (Eng.).
283
Colgan, supra note 178, at 297.
284
Id.
285
492 U.S. 257 (1989).
286
Id. at 264–73.
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sovereign as punishment for some offense.”287 The Court rejected the claim that
punitive damage awards were fines under the Excessive Fines Clause,288 even
though this idea had gained significant traction.289 The Supreme Court’s narrow
definition was, without hesitation, subsequently adopted in three Excessive
Fines Clause cases.290
Throughout the four Excessive Fines Clause cases, the Supreme Court cited
the occasional American statute or case; however, the four opinions lacked any
meaningful attempt to determine how colonial and early American courts and
legislatures imposed and collected fines.291 The Court also did not account for
the temporal gap between the English Bill of Rights and the Excessive Fines
Clause’s ratification over 100 years later.292 While English history can provide
some insight into the way Americans understood economic sanctions, its utility
is limited by the adaptation of English common law to the particularities of
colonial societies, likely changing how the ratifying generation would have
understood the Clause’s meaning.293
The Court’s interpretation of “fines” contains two restrictions: (1) the
sovereign-recipient restriction and (2) the penalties for punitive purposes
restriction. With regard to the first restriction, if the Court had investigated the
ratifying generation’s understanding of fines more in-depth, it would have
discovered that the generation understood fines to be payable to individuals, not
exclusively to the government.294 As to the second restriction, it is important to
note that any evaluation of this requirement will be convoluted,295 which may
explain why the historical support for this restriction is even weaker than the
sovereign-recipient restriction.296 However, the addition of colonial and early
American records to the historical interpretation reveals three problems with the
287

Id. at 265.
Id. at 259–60.
289
Colgan, supra note 178, at 298.
290
See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 324 (1998) (holding that a forfeiture of cash resulting
from a criminal conviction for failure to report the transportation of money overseas was a fine under the
Browning-Ferris historical definition); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 602–03 (1993) (determining that
a civil in rem forfeiture met the Browning-Ferris historical definition of a fine); Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 544–45 (1993) (holding that an in personam forfeiture also met the Browning-Ferris historical
definition of a fine).
291
See, e.g., Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334–37.
292
See id. (citing Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 556–
57 (2006)).
293
Id.
294
See id. at 327–28.
295
See id. at 346 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“It is a mark of the Court’s doctrinal difficulty that we must
speak of nonpunitive penalties, which is a contradiction in terms.”).
296
Colgan, supra note 178, at 310.
288
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Court’s punitive purpose requirement.297 First, the historical use of relevant
nomenclature was broader than the Court allowed.298 Second, the use of
economic sanctions that have remedial qualities for the purpose of punishment
belies the Court’s attempt to distinguish between remedial and punitive
sanctions.299 Third, the identical collection treatment for fines and remedial
sanctions suggests that the ratifying generation would have seen the two
financial obligations as the same.300 While these additional historical records do
not define fines, they indicate that the ratifying generation would have
understood fines to be payable to individuals and would not have divided
remedial and punitive penalties when determining whether a sanction qualified
as a fine.301
Even though the Supreme Court examined only a truncated historical record
when interpreting “fines,”302 it studied that history. Rather than engaging in the
same substantial examination of history to interpret the term “excessive,” the
Supreme Court chose instead to simply adopt the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause’s gross disproportionality test in the fourth Excessive Fines case heard
by the Court.303 The Supreme Court’s only interpretation of “excessive” came
from United States v. Bajakajian.304 There, the Court briefly discussed how
proportional a fine must be to a criminal offense by considering an English case
that only described excessiveness in general terms305 and the Magna Carta.
Then, the Court simply adopted the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause’s
gross disproportionality test without considering any textual or historical
distinctions between the Eighth Amendment’s different provisions.306
Additionally, the Supreme Court did not address the question of impoverishment
as it related to this test.307 Instead, the conversation focused on the
proportionality of the fine in light of the offense, the petitioner’s characteristics,
and the harm caused.308 Not surprisingly, the opinion has resulted in confusion.
Lower courts have interpreted the opinion to mean both “that proportionality

297

Id. at 311.
Id. (noting that in the historical records economic sanctions called fines were used for remedial
purposes, court costs, and incarceration costs).
299
Id.
300
Id.
301
Id. at 310.
302
Id. at 299.
303
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334–37 (1998).
304
Id. at 322.
305
Id. at 335 (citing Earl of Devonshire’s Case, 11 How. St. Tr. 1367, 1372 (H.L. 1689)).
306
Id. at 336–37.
307
Id. at 337–40.
308
Id.
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between the penalty imposed and the harm caused is the exclusive consideration
in assessing whether a fine is excessive, or alternatively, that proportionality is
a necessary albeit not exclusive condition whereby the Magna Carta’s
prohibition against impoverishing defendants may be brought to bear.”309
Regardless of which interpretation is correct, the historical record suggests that
the ratifying generation would have held a broader understanding of the concept
of excessiveness.310 That generation likely would have considered three factors
when determining whether a fine was excessive: first, facts related to the offense
and offender characteristics related to culpability; second, the fine’s effect on
the offender and his family; and third, the balance between the effect of the fine
and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime.311
Because of the limited historical record the Court used in interpreting “fines”
and “excessive,” the Court or Congress should reinterpret the Clause to be more
faithful to the entire historical record. After reviewing and weighing all relevant
history, it seems that a “fine” is a deprivation of anything of economic value in
response to a public offense, regardless of the recipient or purpose.312 As for the
term “excessive,” the strongest historical evidence indicates both proportionality
and effect are constitutionally relevant.313 Evidence suggests that proportionality
should include both offense and offender characteristics that reflect the level of
culpability in a case.314 The evidence regarding effect is more complicated since
the only evidence with explicit constitutional roots would support a bar on fines
that would impoverish the defendant,315 whereas weaker evidence from colonial
and early American records sometimes supports and other times contradicts this
bar.316 Thus, if the Court or Congress desires to be consistent with the entire
historical record, it should reinterpret “fines” to mean deprivation of anything of
economic value in response to a public offense, regardless of whether it has a
punitive purpose, and “excessive” should be assessed through broad
understanding of proportionality and the fine’s effect on the offender.
Under these new interpretations, fines and fees for youth offenders would
likely be categorically banned. Under the suggested meaning of “fines,” all fines
and fees discussed in this Comment would be considered fines and, under the
309

See Colgan, supra note 178, at 321.
Id. at 322.
311
Id. at 335–36.
312
Id. at 340–43.
313
Id. at 343–45.
314
See id.
315
See MAGNA CARTA, ch. 20–21 (1215), reprinted in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 42 (rev. ed. 1998).
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Colgan, supra note 178, at 345.
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suggested assessment of “excessive,” most fines and fees would be considered
excessive because they would likely impoverish juveniles, who already lack
resources. The fines and fees discussed in this Comment are imposed following
a juvenile’s arrest and are paid to the government. Thus, the issue of a nonsovereign recipient is not a concern. Additionally, the violations discussed in
this Comment only relate to public offenses. The only possible concern is related
to the purpose of the different fines and fees since most of the financial
obligations discussed in this Comment are nonpunitive. However, under the new
interpretation, the punitive or nonpunitive division would no longer matter for
the Excessive Fines Clause. Therefore, all fines and fees discussed in this
Comment would be considered fines under the suggested interpretation, which
encompasses a more accurate and complete historical record.
Under the suggested interpretation of “excessive,” courts would have to
account for the offense and offender’s characteristics, as well as the fine’s effect
on the offender. While there are a variety of offenses juveniles can commit, all
juveniles have one common characteristic that relates to their culpability, which
is their immature brain development. As discussed above, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly discussed the need for constitutional protections to be calibrated
to the unique developmental needs of adolescents.317 The Court first noted in
Roper that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing,” partially because of their “diminished culpability.”318 The Court
subsequently cited this language in Graham,319 Miller,320 and Montgomery.321
This diminished culpability characteristic must also apply to juveniles when it
comes to determining whether a fine is excessive. Under the suggested
interpretation, this diminished culpability would lean in favor of a fine against a
juvenile being considered excessive. Additionally, most juveniles lack the
resources needed to pay court fines and fees. Thus, the effect on most offenders
would be detrimental. A significant number of juveniles would only be able to
acquire a minimum-wage job and, because of compulsory education and labor
laws, if a juvenile worked the maximum number of hours they were allowed
every day, they would have to work over two months to pay off the average

317

See supra text accompanying notes 245–265.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–71 (2005). “Three general differences between juveniles under
18 and adults demonstrates that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders.” Id. at 569. First, a lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth
more often than in adults. Id. Second, juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and
outside pressures. Id. Third, the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult. Id. at 570.
319
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
320
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
321
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016).
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amount of court fees.322 Court fines and fees are likely to push juveniles into a
cycle of debt or back into illegal activity to raise enough money to pay their fines
and fees.323 Some state statutes impose fines and fees on youth offenders’
parents rather than the juvenile offender, but these are also likely to harm the
parents and family or juvenile.324 Since every juvenile will have the
characteristic of “diminished culpability,”325 and most fines will likely have a
detrimental effect on each juvenile or their family, it appears fines are almost
always excessive when charged to juveniles. Thus, rather than forcing judges to
balance the above-mentioned factors, leading to inconsistent results, Congress
should follow the Supreme Court’s trajectory of providing juveniles with certain
protections and categorically eliminate fines and fees for youth offenders.
C. Unlawful Application of State Statutes
The final legal reason Congress should categorically eliminate fines and fees
for youth offenders is because judges unlawfully apply their state’s statutes.
Recent research has identified several unlawful fee policies and practices.326
First, some counties charge fees that violate state law.327 Second, although not
discussed in this Comment, research has shown that some judges charge fees
that exceed the statutory maximum.328 Third, as discussed above, by failing to
properly assess a youth’s ability to pay, counties are engaged in unconstitutional
fee practices.329
As described above, state laws authorize counties to charge juveniles with
several different fines and fees.330 However, some counties and judges feel the
need to charge even more fines and fees than are permitted by law. For example,
although only twenty-five states have statutes related to court expenses for
juveniles, respondents to the JLC survey in twenty-eight states reported that
youth or families were charged court expenses.331 According to the same survey,
although only twenty-two states have statutes related to costs for informal
adjustment or diversion, twenty-six states impose these fees.332 The imposition

322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332

Under 29 U.S.C. § 206, the federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012).
Markowitz, supra note 1.
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 7.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–71 (2005).
CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 14.
Id.
See id.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 17.
Id. at 12.
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of a fine or fee without a state statute specifically addressing said financial
obligation is unlawful. Rather than trying to create a system to ensure that such
unlawful imposition does not occur in every county, city, and state, Congress
should systematically eliminate fines and fees for youth offenders.
Another report, which focused specifically on California before its repeal of
fines and fees for youth offenders, found that although California law never
authorized counties to charge families for their children’s investigation
reports,333 eleven counties reportedly charged for this information.334 These fees
ranged from $250 to $1,200 per case.335 Any county that charged a fee to
families for a juvenile investigation report was doing so in violation of California
law; however, nothing was done to stop this unlawful activity until the entire
state categorically banned fines and fees for youth offenders. Rather than
keeping watch of all fifty states’ statutes relating to fines and fees for youth
offenders and all judges’ applications of these statutes, it would be less
cumbersome and harmful to categorically eliminate all fines and fees for youth
offenders.
The imposition of fines and fees on youth offenders is unconstitutional under
the Supreme Court’s holdings in Williams,336 Tate,337 and Bearden,338 would be
categorically banned under a correct interpretation of the Excessive Fines
Clause, and is unlawful in some jurisdictions. Additionally, Congress must take
into consideration the unique circumstances and needs of juveniles given
compulsory education and labor laws, the effect of imposing fines and fees on
youths’ families, and the Supreme Court’s repeated statement that constitutional
protections must be adjusted to the developmental needs of adolescents. Because
of these legal concerns, Congress should categorically classify juveniles as
indigent and eliminate the imposition of fines and fees for youth offenders.
IV. POLICY REASONS
The remainder of this Comment focuses on the policy reasons for
eliminating fines and fees for youth offenders. According to the JLC, research
on adults has shown that these economic sanctions “exacerbate poverty for
333
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1a (West 2019) (applying only to cases “in which a defendant is convicted
of an offense”); Santa Clara County, Cal., Res. No. BOS-2017-6 (2017). In California, “convicted of an offense”
is a term of art that refers to adults. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 2019).
334
CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 14.
335
Id.
336
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970).
337
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971).
338
Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
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indigent adults and their families and interfere with defendants’ capacity to find
permanent housing, manage drug or alcohol addictions, and maintain strong
social bonds.”339 For juveniles, the consequences may be equally, if not more,
harmful. Recent research has presented three main policy reasons for the
elimination of fines and fees for youth offenders.340 First, because youth in
poverty and youth of color are overrepresented in the juvenile justice system,
fines and fees exacerbate economic and racial disparities.341 Second, research
has shown that the imposition of fines and fees on youth offenders correlates
with higher youth recidivism, which is against the core values of the juvenile
justice system.342 Third, fees cause financial hardship to families, weaken family
relationships, and undercut family reunification.343
A. Exacerbating Economic and Racial Disparities
Financial obligations in the juvenile justice system exacerbate the system’s
existing economic and racial disparities.344 Youth in poverty and youth of color
are overrepresented at every stage in the juvenile justice system, leading to a
greater financial burden for these individuals and exacerbating already existing
disparities.345 The core values of the juvenile justice system relate to
rehabilitation and improved outcomes.346 However, imposing fines and fees that
lead to unequal and unfair treatment does nothing to help these goals.
Because fines and fees for youth offenders lead to inherently unequal
treatment for impoverished youth, Congress should eliminate fines and fees for
youth offenders. The U.S. government has been working for years to try to get
rid of economic inequality. For example, Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), and its predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), have an over fifty-year history.347 The TANF program is one of the
U.S. federal assistance programs that provides cash assistance to indigent

339

FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 6.
CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 11.
341
See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
342
See Press Release, Ctr. on Juvenile & Criminal Justice, Coalition Hails Governor for Signing Historic
Juvenile Justice Reform Bill, and Calls for an Immediate End to all Juvenile Fee Assessments and Collections
(Oct. 12, 2017), https://ebclc.org/in-the-news/coalition-hails-governor-signing-historic-juvenile-justice-reformbill-calls-immediate-end-juvenile-fee-assessments-collections/.
343
See CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 11.
344
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
345
Id.; see CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 11.
346
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
347
Work for Welfare, FED. SAFETY NET, http://federalsafetynet.com/work-for-welfare.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2020).
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American families.348 This program, emphasizing the welfare-to-work principle,
is a grant given to each state to run their own welfare program and requires all
recipients to find work within two years of receiving aid.349 Reducing economic
inequality among U.S. citizens is an important goal for the government.
With respect to youth in poverty, these disparities occur because of unequal
access to quality counsel, a system that allows children with access to private
services avoid juvenile justice system involvement, high rates of youth from the
child welfare system entering the juvenile justice system, and disproportionate
entry into the juvenile justice system by youth in highly policed
neighborhoods.350 Youth in poverty face harsher consequences than their
affluent peers simply because of their inability to pay.351 For example, youth
who cannot pay for alternative programs may enter the juvenile justice system
when a wealthier peer would not.352 Poorer youth are more likely to be charged
with violations of probation for failure to pay costs.353 Youth in poverty may be
unable to expunge a juvenile record because they owe money to the court.354
These harsh consequences intensify the already existing inequalities in the
juvenile justice system.355
Additionally, recent data suggest that juvenile fines and fees
disproportionately harm youth and families of color.356 As mentioned above,
youth of color are overrepresented at every stage in the criminal justice
system.357 While the biggest racial disparities arise in the context of an arrest,
such disparities are also evidenced at decisional stages including diversion,
detention, probation, and commitment to placement.358 One study found that
youth of color were more likely to still owe costs and owe a higher amount upon
case closing.359 These disparities persist despite similar offending rates among
white youth and youth of color for common juvenile offenses.360 Because of this
racially disproportionate treatment, youth of color face a heavier financial
348

Id.
Id.
350
For a more detailed discussion of these and other factors leading to economic disparities in the system,
see generally Tamar Birkhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 53 (2012).
351
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 11.
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See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH COMMITMENTS AND ARRESTS 6 (2016).
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burden compared to their white counterparts.361 Additionally, because judges
punish youth of color more frequently and harshly than their white peers, these
youth offenders and often their families are liable for higher burdens.362
Similar to the desire to end economic disparities in the United States, the
government and society as a whole have been trying to end racial disparities
since the Civil Rights movement. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national
origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance.363 Most
funding agencies have regulations implementing this law that also prohibit
recipient practices that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin.364 More recently, both former President George W.
Bush and former Secretary of State and Democratic presidential candidate
Hillary Clinton spoke about ending racial inequality.365 Reducing racial
inequality is a significant and timely goal for the government.366 This goal has
also recently been addressed regarding the juvenile justice system. In 2018,
President Trump authorized the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act.367 This Act provides for a nationwide justice planning and advisory system
spanning all states, territories, and the District of Columbia, federal funding for
delinquency prevention and improvements in state and local juvenile justice
programs and practices, and the operation of a federal agency, the Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.368 The Act was based on a broad
consensus that youth and families involved in the juvenile courts should be
guarded by federal standards for care and custody.369 As it relates to racial
inequality, under this new law, states must begin collecting data on racial
disparities in the juvenile justice system and develop specific strategies for
addressing those inequalities.370
361

CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 11.
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George W. Bush, Ending Racial Inequality, C-SPAN (July 10, 2000), https://www.c-span.org/video/
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See 34 U.S.C. § 11101 (2012).
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Fee structures that push youth offenders deeper into the juvenile justice
system for failure to pay contravene the rehabilitative goal of the juvenile justice
system. Because the imposition of fines and fees for youth offenders have an
economically and racially disparate impact, youth in poverty and youth of color
may face harsher consequences and receive less rehabilitative treatment than
their wealthier and white peers. Not only is it unfair for youth in poverty and
youth of color to receive less rehabilitative treatment than their more affluent
and white counterparts, but it is unfair for all youth offenders to have this
financial burden imposed upon them that is contradictory to the core values of
the juvenile justice system.371
B. Increasing Likelihood of Recidivism
The use of monetary penalties aimed at punishment for delinquent acts and
for deterring subsequent offending has long been a part of criminal justice
systems.372 While some sort of financial penalty may be a reasonable
punishment, it may also result in adverse consequences.373 For example, recent
research suggests that fines and fees on youth offenders may increase the
likelihood of youth recidivism.374 One study found that the likelihood of
recidivism was exacerbated among youth with more costs imposed at disposition
and youth who owed costs upon case closing.375 This recent study also found
that families of color were almost twice as likely as white families to have fine
and fee debt upon their child’s case closing.376 Thus, families of color are not
only harmed by the greater likelihood and amount of fee debt, but also by the
likelihood it will lead to recidivism.
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See FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
See Piquero & Jennings, supra note 173, at 28.
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Id.; Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015) (describing how
mandatory fees for youth in the juvenile court system can create insurmountable fee burdens, increasing the
likelihood of youth recidivating); Stacy Hoskins Haynes et al., Juvenile Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of
Their Imposition, Payment, and Effect on Recidivism, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 31, 37–38 (2014)
(describing studies showing that the burdens of economic sanctions “might interfere with a juvenile’s ability to
reenter society successfully after a conviction, thereby increasing the risk of recidivism”); R. Barry Ruback, The
Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the Offender, and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV.
1779, 1796, 1811–12 (2015) (describing how the imposition of economic sanctions increases the likelihood of
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Similar to society’s desire to combat economic and racial disparities, the
government and society as a whole have been trying to decrease recidivism rates
for years. Over the last decade, state legislation has aimed to reduce recidivism
rates by providing offenders with educational and job-training services and skills
they need to be successful after release.377 More recently, legislation signed by
President Trump makes significant changes to the treatment and rehabilitation
of federal prisoners.378 Under this legislation, qualifying inmates can earn credit
to be released from prison early and serve the remainder of their sentence in
home confinement or halfway houses if they participate in the plan’s antirecidivism programs.379 The government and society are working to reduce
recidivism throughout the entire criminal justice system, and there should be no
exception for the juvenile justice system.
Additionally, although the juvenile justice system has changed tremendously
since its creation in 1899, it still maintains rehabilitation as its primary goal.380
However, the most rigorous study to date concludes that fines and fees greatly
increase the likelihood of youth recidivism.381 This finding is contradictory to
the primary goal of the juvenile justice system. This system was established to
help youth offenders and ensure they thrive after their experience in it;382
however, high fines and fees make youth offenders’ success highly unlikely. If
Congress truly believes the goal of the juvenile justice system should be
rehabilitation, then it should eliminate the imposition of fines and fees on youth
offenders.
C. Creating Hardship on Families
Fines and fees on youth offenders impose significant hardships on the large
number of families in the juvenile justice system who cannot afford to pay
them.383 These hardships frustrate the core values of the juvenile justice
system.384 Further, these fines and fees force families to choose between paying

377
Lucia Bragg, Federal Criminal Justice Reform in 2018, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Mar. 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/federal-criminal-justice-reform-in-2018.aspx.
378
First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391,132 Stat. 5194.
379
Andrea Drusch, Trump’s Prison Plan to Release Thousands of Inmates, MCCLATCHY DC BUREAU
(Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/congress/article223414935.html.
380
FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 8.
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Piquero & Jennings, supra note 173, at 28.
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FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 4.
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CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 9.
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for necessities and paying the jurisdiction, they weaken ties between juveniles
and their families by adding stress, and they undermine family reunification.385
For a single parent making federal minimum wage, the average court costs
of $2,000 constitute roughly two months’ salary.386 Even average, or seemingly
minimal, payments may require families to choose between buying basic
necessities and paying court-ordered fees.387 Respondents to the JLC survey
reported that fees cause difficulties for families who are “surviving on a day to
day basis” and that “[s]ome of these families are teetering on the brink
[financially] when their children enter the juvenile justice system and the added
costs push them further.”388 Some families “have difficulty scraping together 10
to 15 dollars out of their monthly budget to pay” these fees.389 Even that cost
“means the difference to some [families] between eating for a day or two.”390
Another respondent noted that even being required to pay a single type of cost
“results in families not having funds for rent, food, groceries.”391 Parents and
families need this money for personal necessities and to care for their children.
If parents are required to pay this significant amount of money, they will lack
resources for present and future expenses, leading to a cycle of debt and poverty.
In addition to these fines and fees creating financial hardship for many
families involved in the juvenile justice system, research also shows that
charging juvenile administrative fees weakens family relationships.392 Many
families already have challenging relationships due to their child’s involvement
in the juvenile justice system, and adding a financial burden can amplify feelings
of anger or resentment.393 One youth offender incarcerated in Calabasas said he
worried about the bills for fees imposed in his case every day.394 He explained
that his mother worked two jobs and his rebellion cost the family a lot, causing
tension and arguments.395 Although he wanted to return home, he knew the stress
from the financial burden would make it hard to go back to his family.396 One
385

CAMPOS-BUI ET AL., supra note 118, at 9–10.
The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). For a single parent making the
federal minimum wage, it would take approximately seven forty-hour work weeks, or 276 hours, to pay off costs
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father described how fees from his son’s detention strained their relationship.397
He explained that the fees “don’t do anything besides make it more difficult for
families to take care of each other,” and that if the government garnished his
wages, he would not be a better father, but would be “more angry at [his] son.”398
These feelings of anger and resentment, combined with parental liability for
fees, pull families apart. For example, one grandmother assumed guardianship
of her three grandchildren after her daughter passed away.399 However, when
her grandson was placed in juvenile hall and she received a large bill for court
costs, she considered relinquishing custody of him to the county.400 In another
instance, one youth offender was so distressed by the financial impact of his
actions on his family that he considered running away from home and living on
the streets in the hope that his family would be relieved of the financial
burden.401 Additionally, parental liability for juvenile fees does not hold the
youth offender accountable or deter them from future delinquent acts but may
create a hardship on the parents and offender’s siblings. The costs imposed for
juvenile justice involvement may determine “if another child in the family goes
to college or not[, g]ets school clothes or not[, or gets] to do anything else other
children get to do because money is being spent on the juvenile system.”402
Imposing fines and fees on youth offenders exacerbates economic and racial
disparities, increases the likelihood of recidivism, and creates a hardship on
families. The juvenile justice system is designed to help young people meet their
potential, get back on track, and become productive members of their
communities.403 However, the imposition of fines and fees hinders these goals.
For youth and families who cannot afford these payments, consequences include
recidivism, incarceration, and significant financial strain. Moreover, existing
studies suggest that fines and fees have limited fiscal benefit to states and
counties given the difficulty in collecting from families in poverty and the high
administrative costs in attempting to do so.404 The best solution to these negative
consequences and lack of benefit is for Congress to categorically eliminate fines
and fees for youth offenders.
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CONCLUSION
Across the country, youth and their families, including many in poverty, face
monetary charges for a youth offender’s involvement in the juvenile justice
system. These fines and fees are unfair and unrealistic given adverse economic
conditions faced by most families with youth in the juvenile system, and the
consequences can be devastating. Youth and families who cannot pay face
“criminal contempt, civil judgments that follow them into adulthood, probation
violations, additional fees, incarceration, property liens, and ineligibility for
expungement.”405 Too often, the inability to pay pushes an offender deeper into
the juvenile justice system and exacerbates the family’s economic and emotional
hardship.
Because fines and fees cause so much harm to youth and families, the best
solution is for Congress to categorically eliminate the assessment and imposition
of these financial burdens on youth offenders. Congress should follow
California’s lead and establish a more sustainable and effective model for
funding court systems instead of attempting to get “blood from a turnip.”406
Some may be worried about the revenue loss to counties by eliminating fines
and fees for youth offenders, but these fines and fees generate minimal profits
to counties. If all fines and fees for youth offenders are eliminated, the small
amount of net gain each county gives up could be paid for by that state’s funds
appropriated to the state department that oversees the juvenile justice system.407
It is time to re-focus the juvenile justice system by eliminating fines and fees
placed on youth who are not old enough to work full time or enter into contracts.
The juvenile justice system was designed to help youth meet their potential and
get back on track. However, the imposition of fines and fees that are unlikely to
be paid do nothing for these goals. Thus, Congress should eliminate these
financial burdens and require youth to perform community service or participate
in diversion programs. The nation must remember that the juvenile court system
was created because youth are different from adults and adjust the focus on a
child’s development and rehabilitation rather than his or her money.
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FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 29, at 7.
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If Congress does not feel it can completely eliminate fines and fees for youth
offenders, then it should at least require states to scale back these fines and fees.
Congress could start by either eliminating some fines and fees, setting a ceiling
on the number of fines and fees a county can charge, or setting a ceiling on the
amount of money a county can charge. If Congress decides to require states to
eliminate some fees, the first ones Congress should remove are fees for public
defenders. The nation should ensure that “free” counsel is actually free of any
costs for youth in the justice system. This approach would provide youth with
the rights promised in Gault and Gideon, while also creating a more equitable
juvenile justice system. If Congress decides it wants to allow states to impose
any fees they want, then Congress should set a limit on the amount a county can
impose in total fees on a youth offender. A recent study suggests there appears
to be a “sweet spot” beyond which there is a diminishing probability youth will
be able to pay their debt in full.408 Because a youth offender will likely be unable
to pay more than this threshold amount, Congress should require states to put a
cap on fines and fees in this amount. These approaches can hold youth offenders
accountable while also supporting youth in realizing their potential.
LEIGH R. SHAPIRO*

408

Piquero & Jennings, supra note 173, at 29.
Managing Editor, Emory Law Journal, Volume 69; Emory University School of Law, J.D., 2020;
Tulane University, B.A., 2017. Thank you to my faculty advisor, Professor Martha Fineman, for her guidance
throughout the writing process. Thank you to Rashmi Borah, George Brewster, and the rest of the Emory Law
Journal editors for their thoughtful and diligent feedback throughout the editing process. And finally, thank you
to my family and friends for their continuous love and support.
*

